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George A. Akerlof (1970) shows how asymmetric information can create adverse selection and
undermine market efficiency. Economic and legal institutions, such as auditors, underwriters,
accountants, or used-car dealers, often emerge to limit adverse selection and allow markets to
function. As a result, direct government interventions are usually unnecessary. If a market does
collapse, however—presumably following the failure of the institutions designed to prevent the
collapse in the first place—a government might want to intervene. This paper asks what form these
interventions should take if the goal of policy is to improve economic efficiency with minimal cost
to taxpayers.
We study an economy with borrowing and investment under asymmetric information. Firms
must raise capital to take advantage of profitable investment opportunities, but also have private
information about the value of their existing assets. Optimal financial contracts can only partially
limit adverse selection, and inefficiencies occur because the safest borrowers, facing unfairly high
interest rates, drop out of the market. Competitive lenders then rationally charge a high rate
to the remaining borrowers, lending and investment are inefficiently low, and there is scope for a
government intervention.
We characterize cost-minimizing interventions to improve lending and investment, and we pro-
pose implementations with standard financial contracts. The key novel aspect of our analysis is
the interaction between the government’s intervention and the borrowing terms that firms face
in the market. Potential lenders rationally interpret participation decisions as signals of private
information. Therefore, the rate at which non-participants borrow depends on who participates
in the program. In equilibrium, participation decisions affect outside options through signaling,
while outside options influence the cost of the program through the participation constraints. This
feedback distinguishes our work from the existing mechanism-design literature, in which outside
options are exogenous.
Several dimensions must be considered when designing an optimal program, from the selection of
types to the nature of financial contracts. Interactions between these choices and the endogenous
outside options make the problem quite complex. For instance, one might conjecture that the
government should try to selectively attract the good types who drop out of the private market.
To do so, it might be optimal to offer different securities from the ones private lenders use. In this
case, successful interventions could be cheap, or even profitable. Alternatively, if interventions are
unavoidably costly, it might be important to minimize the number of participants in the program.
Finally, the government might be tempted to restrict access to private markets. Our analysis
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clarifies these conjectures.
Our model has the following features. All firms have investment opportunities with positive
net present value. A firm’s privately known type θ, drawn from some interval
[
θ, θ¯
]
, indexes the
quality of its legacy assets and, therefore, determines the conditional distribution of its total income
y. We assume that f(y|θ) satisfies the monotone hazard rate property. In this environment, the
optimal contract between firms and private investors is a debt contract. A decentralized equilibrium
is characterized by a cutoff θD: types in
[
θ, θD
]
invest, while types above θD, faced with an
unfairly high interest rate, forego investment. The lack of investment by types in
[
θD, θ¯
]
represents
the welfare loss of adverse selection. The goal of the government is to increase investment while
minimizing the cost of its intervention for taxpayers.
We obtain five main results. The first result is that, regardless of how the government designs
its intervention, it cannot selectively attract the best types. An equilibrium with intervention is
similar to the decentralized equilibrium, but with a higher investment cutoff θT > θD. Interventions
that improve investment are always costly.
The second result is that the investment level achieved by an optimal program can be assessed
simply by looking at the borrowing rate outside the program. To establish this result, we show that
in any equilibrium, the best type investing θT must weakly prefer borrow from the market than
from the government. This implies a one-to-one mapping between the investment level achieved by
any program and the borrowing market rate of non-participants.
The third result is that the actual size of a program is, to a large extent, irrelevant. In equi-
librium, the market rate is pinned down by the average quality of non-participants through the
break-even constraint of private lenders. This average quality must be good enough to sustain pri-
vate lending beyond θD and up to θT . This requirement, however, is consistent with many different
participation functions. For instance, there is a unique minimal program where the government
attracts all the worst types (up to some threshold), and the market then faces a truncated distri-
bution with a better average quality than in the decentralized equilibrium. There exists, however,
a continuum of other programs that achieve the same target investment θT , the same break-even
market rate, and the same implementation cost. In some of these programs, all types below θT
might borrow from the government with positive probability.
The fourth result is that optimal implementation requires debt-like instruments. Implementa-
tion costs are at least as high as the rents that lower types obtain if they mimic θT and borrow
from the market. Reaching the minimum cost therefore requires that participation constraints
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bind simultaneously for all types. This is possible only if repayment functions are the same inside
and outside the program. Since private investors use debt contracts, the government must employ
debt-like securities. The government may lend directly or it may guarantee privately issued debt.
Other instruments (e.g., equity injections) are more expensive because participation constraints
cannot bind for several types at once.
Our fifth result is that, even if the government could shut down the private markets, this would
not lower the cost of implementation. This is because the cost of an optimal intervention is equal to
the rents that all investing types obtain by mimicking type θT . Since θT is, by definition, indifferent
between investing and not, its payoff is the same whether or not there is a market.
Finally, we extend our benchmark model by relaxing the assumption that investment opportu-
nities are the same for all types. Our results continue to hold with asymmetric information about
new opportunities. When we allow banks to choose the riskiness of their investments after they
opt into the program, we find that moral hazard is mitigated by the endogenous response of the
private interest rate, and can be eliminated by indexing the terms of the government’s program to
that rate.
Discussion of the literature
Our work is motivated by the history of financial crises. W. Charles Calomiris & Gary Gor-
ton (1991) analyze the evolution of two competing views of banking panics. The “random with-
drawal” theory (Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig 1983, Sudipto Bhattacharya & Douglas
Gale 1987, V. V. Chari 1989) focuses on bank liabilities and coordination among depositors. The
“asymmetric information” theory emphasizes asymmetric information about banks’ assets. Accord-
ing to Calomiris & Gorton (1991) and S. Frederic Mishkin (1991), the historical evidence supports
the idea that asymmetric information plays a critical role in banking crises. Several features of
the financial-market collapse in Fall 2008 also suggest a role for asymmetric information (Florian
Heider, Marie Hoerova & Cornelia Holthausen 2008, Darrell Duffie 2009, Gary Gorton 2009).1 Gov-
ernments stepped in with large-scale interventions, but there was no consensus about exactly which
programs should be offered.2 Finally, there is ample evidence that borrowing from the government
1Heider, Hoerova & Holthausen (2008) discuss the collapse of the interbank market. Duffie (2009) discusses
the OTC and repo markets. In the OTC market, the range of acceptable forms of collateral was dramatically
reduced,“leaving over 80% of collateral in the form of cash during 2008,” while the “repo financing of many forms
of collateralized debt obligations and speculative-rate bonds became essentially impossible.” Gorton (2009) explains
how the complexity of securitized assets created asymmetric information about the size and location of risk. Investors
and banks were unable to agree on prices for legacy assets or for bank equity. The classic references on financial crises
(Walter Bagehot 1873, Oliver M. W. Sprague 1910) do not discuss the role of asymmetric information explicitly.
2In the U.S., the original TARP called for $700 billion to purchase illiquid assets but was transformed into a Capital
Purchase Program (CPP) to invest $250 billion in U.S. banks. As of August 2009, $307 billion of outstanding debt
was issued by financial companies and guaranteed by the FDIC. The treasury also insured $306 billion of Citibank’s
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(for banks), or from the IMF (for countries) carries a stigma (Stavros Peristiani 1998, Jenny Corbett
& Janet Mitchell 2000, Janet Mitchell 2001, Craig H. Furfine 2005).
Our paper builds on the rich literature that studies asymmetric information, following Akerlof
(1970), A. Michael Spence (1974), and Joseph E. Stiglitz & Andrew Weiss (1981). It is useful
to relate our work to the particular branch that deals with security design. Stewart C Myers &
Nicholas S. Majluf (1984) argue that debt can be used to reduce mispricing when issuers have
private information. Michael Brennan & Alan Kraus (1987) consider various financing strategies to
reduce adverse selection. Technically, we build on the contribution of David Nachman & Thomas
Noe (1994), who clarify the conditions under which debt is optimal in a multi-type capital-raising
game. Peter DeMarzo & Darrell Duffie (1999) also discuss the optimality of debt when the security
design occurs before private information is learned.
Our paper is also related to the literature on government interventions to improve market
outcomes. Some of the literature deals specifically with bank bailouts. Gary Gorton & Lixin
Huang (2004) argue that the government can bail out banks in distress because it can provide
liquidity more effectively than private investors can. Douglas Diamond & Raghuram Rajan (2005)
show that bank bailouts can backfire by increasing the demand for liquidity and causing further
insolvency. Douglas Diamond (2001) emphasizes that governments should bail out only the banks
that have specialized knowledge about their borrowers. Philippe Aghion, Patrick Bolton & Steven
Fries (1999) show that bailouts can be designed so as not to distort ex-ante lending incentives.
Efficient bailouts are studied by Thomas Philippon & Philipp Schnabl (2009) in the context of debt
overhang, and by Emmanuel Farhi & Jean Tirole (2010) in the context of collective moral hazard,
while V. V. Chari & Patrick J. Kehoe (2009) argue that the time-inconsistency problem is more
severe for the government than for private agents.
Some papers study government interventions in the presence of competitive markets. Philip
Bond & Arvind Krishnamurthy (2004) study enforcement when a defaulting borrower can only be
excluded from future credit markets. Alberto Bisin & Andriano Rampini (2006) argue that market
access can be a substitute for government’s commitment. Mikhail Golosov & Aleh Tsyvinski (2007)
study the crowding-out effect of government interventions in private insurance markets.3 Emmanuel
assets, and $118 billion of Bank of America’s. George Soros (2009) and Joseph Stiglitz (2008) argue for equity
injections; Ben Bernanke (2009) favors asset purchases and debt guarantee; Douglas Diamond, Steve Kaplan, Anil
Kashyap, Raghuram Rajan & Richard Thaler (2008) view purchases and equity injection as the best alternatives;
and Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton (2009) argue for a careful way to “price the assets, either implicitly or
explicitly.”
3There is also an extensive literature on how government interventions can improve risk sharing. For excellent
surveys, see Narayana Kocherlakota (2006), Mikhail Golosov, Aleh Tsyvinski & Ivan Werning (2006), and Narayana
Kocherlakota (2009).
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Farhi, Mikhail Golosov & Aleh Tsyvinski (2009), building on Charles J. Jacklin (1987), show how
liquidity requirements can improve equilibrium allocations. The critical difference is that, in our
paper, government intervention affects market conditions through signaling and adverse selection.
The most closely related papers are Enrico Minelli & Salvatore Modica (2009) and Jean Tirole
(2010). Minelli & Modica (2009), building on Stiglitz & Weiss (1981), model the intervention
as a sequential game between the government and a monopolistic lender. Like us, Tirole (2010)
emphasizes the role of endogenous outside options. Our models assume different frictions that
prevent the efficient financing of new projects. Tirole (2010) assumes moral hazard in addition
to adverse selection, while we follow Myers & Majluf (1984) and assume that returns of old and
new projects are fungible. Some results are, nonetheless, similar. For example, Tirole (2010) also
finds that the government cannot selectively attract good types, and that it does not benefit from
shutting down private markets. Another difference between our work and both Minelli & Modica
(2009) and Tirole (2010) is that we allow for continuous payoffs (as opposed to binary ones). This
allows us to discuss security design.
We present our model in Section 1. In Section 2, we characterize its decentralized equilibria.
We formally describe the mechanism-design problem in Section 3. In Section 4, we characterize
lower bounds on the costs of government interventions. Those bounds can actually be achieved
by simple, common interventions, as we show in Section 5. Section 6 discusses extensions, and we
close the paper with some final remarks in Section 7.
1 The Model
Our model has three dates, t = 0, 1, 2, and a continuum of firms with pre-existing ‘legacy’ assets.
The firms start with private information regarding the quality of their legacy assets and receive
the opportunity to make a new investment at time 1. The government can offer various programs
at time 0, and firms can borrow and lend in a competitive market at time 1. We assume that all
agents are risk-neutral and we normalize the risk-free rate to zero. The timing of the model is
depicted in Figure 1.
insert Figure 1 here
Initial assets and cash balance
Firms start with cash and legacy assets, and no pre-existing liabilities. Cash is liquid and can be
kept, invested or lent at time 1. Let ct denote the cash holdings at the beginning of period t. All
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firms start with c0 in cash, but c1 can differ from c0 if the government injects cash in the firms at
time 0. Cash holdings cannot be negative: ct ≥ 0 for all t.
The book value of legacy assets, A, is known, but some assets may be impaired, and the
eventual payoff at time 2 is the random variable a ∈ [0, A]. Firms privately know their type θ,
which determines the conditional distribution of the value of legacy assets fa (a|θ). Types are drawn
from a compact set Θ ⊂ [θ, θ¯] with cumulative distribution H (θ).
Investment and borrowing
Firms receive investment opportunities at time 1. Investment requires the fixed amount x and
delivers a random payoff v at time 2. Firms can borrow at time 1 in a competitive market. After
learning its type θ, a firm offers a contract
(
l, yl
)
to the competitive investors, where l is the amount
raised from investors at time 1, and yl is the schedule of repayments to investors at time 2. Without
government intervention, the funding gap of the firms is l0 ≡ x − c0. The government can reduce
the funding gap with cash injections, denoted by m. In this case, c1 = c0 + m, and the firm only
needs to borrow l = l0 − m. We use the generic notation l for the amount actually raised from
private investors. In period 2, the cash balance of the firm is c2(i) = c1 + l − x · i, and its total
income is
τ2(i) = c2(i) + a+ v · i, (1)
where i ∈ {0, 1} is a dummy for the decision to invest at time 1. Total firm income at time 2
depends on the realization of the two random variables a and v. This total income will be split
among initial owners, new lenders, and (potentially) the government.
Assumptions
For simplicity, we assume in our benchmark model that all firms receive the same investment
opportunities. The random payoff v is distributed on [0, V ] according to the density function
fv (v). Let v¯ ≡ E [v] be the expected value of v. To make the problem interesting, we assume that
new projects have positive NPV and that firms need to borrow in order to invest: v¯ > x > c0. We
further assume that contracts can be written only on the total income of the firm at time 2:
Assumption A1: The only observable outcome is total income τ2 defined in equation (1).
Under Assumption 1, repayment schedules can be contingent on total income τ2 but not on a and
v separately. If a firm does not invest, it keeps c2 = c1, and its total income at time 2 is a+ c1. If
it invests, it ends up with c2 = 0 and total income a + v.
4 We define total income conditional on
4It will become clear that the government never finds it optimal to inject cash into the banks beyond m = l0.
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investment as: y ≡ a+ v. The distribution of y, which is the convolution of fa and fv, is denoted
by f . Since fa depends on θ, so does f . Let Y denote the support of y. We assume that f(y|θ)
satisfies the strict monotone hazard rate property:
Assumption A2: For all (y, θ) ∈ Y ×Θ, f(y|θ) > 0, and f(y|θ)1−F (y|θ) is decreasing in θ .
Total income is used to repay the loans taken at time 1 according to a schedule yl. When the
government intervenes, the firm also might need to repay the government, according to a schedule
yg. Our last assumption is to impose a monotonicity condition on the repayment schedules.
Assumption A3: The repayment schedules yl and yg of private lenders and of the government
are non-decreasing in τ2.
Let us briefly discuss the main features of our model. We introduce a binary investment technology
to simplify the strategy space of firms, but it is easy to extend the model to partial investment,
for instance, by having i ∈ {0, 1/2, 1}. In order to stay close to the workhorse model of Myers &
Majluf (1984), we initially assume that all firms receive the same investment opportunities. In this
context, A1 makes private information relevant by preventing the parties from contracting directly
on v (by spinning off the new investment, for example). As an extension, we introduce private
information on v in Section 6. Assumption A2 defines a natural ranking among types regarding
the quality of their legacy assets, from the worst type θ to the best type θ¯. The strict inequalities
in A2 are not crucial, but they simplify some of the proofs. We allow for a general set of types
Θ because, while much intuition can be obtained with just two types, the implementation results
are somewhat special for the two-type case, as we explain in Section 5. Assumption A3 has been
standard in the literature on financial contracting since Robert Innes (1990) and Nachman & Noe
(1994). It renders optimal contracts more realistic by effectively smoothing sharp discontinuities
in repayments, and it can be formally justified by the possibility of hidden trades.5
2 Equilibria without Interventions
Because the credit market is competitive and investors are risk-neutral, in any candidate equilib-
rium, the expected repayments to the lenders must be at least the size of the loan
E
[
yl|I
]
≥ l, (2)
5The justification is that if repayments were to decrease with income, the borrower could secretly add cash to the
bank’s balance sheet by borrowing from a third party, obtaining the lower repayment, immediately repaying the third
party, and obtaining strictly higher returns. See Sections 3.6 and 6.6 in Jean Tirole (2006) for further discussion.
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where I denotes the information set of the private lenders at the time they make the loan. Under
symmetric information, investment decisions would have been independent of the quality of legacy
assets, and all firms would invest since v¯ ≥ x. The symmetric-information allocation is an equi-
librium under asymmetric information when firms can issue risk-free debt. By contrast, adverse
selection can occur when new investments are risky and when there is significant downside risk on
legacy assets.
Contracting game
The contracting game is potentially complex because the kind of security a firm offers might signal
its type. Under assumptions A1 to A3, however, it is a standard result that all firms that invest
offer the same security, and this security is a debt contract.6 The intuition is that bad types want
to mimic good types, while good types seek to separate from bad types. Contracts with high
repayments for low income realizations are relatively more attractive for good types than for bad
types. This is the core idea of Myers & Majluf (1984) in a model with two types, extended by
Nachman & Noe (1994) to an arbitrary set of types.
Equilibria without government intervention
We have explained above that all investing firms offer the same debt contract. Our next step is to
characterize the set of firms that actually invest. Let r be the (gross) interest rate at which firms
borrow. We can define the expected repayment function for type θ as:
ρ (θ, rl) ≡
∫
Y
min (y; rl) f (y|θ) dy. (3)
For a given θ, the function ρ (θ, rl) is increasing in the face value rl. Under symmetric information,
the fair interest rate r∗θ on a loan l to a firm with type θ is implicitly given by l ≡ ρ (θ, r∗θ l). Since
ρ (θ, rl) is increasing in θ, the fair rate is decreasing in θ for any given l. With private information,
however, the interest rate cannot depend explicitly on θ, and better types end up facing an unfair
rate. This is the source of adverse selection.
Without government intervention, firms need to borrow l = l0 = x − c0. Given a market rate
r, a type θ wants to invest if and only if E [a|θ] + v¯ − ρ (θ, rl0) ≥ E [a|θ] + c0. This investment
6There are several ways to obtain this result. One is to let each bank offer one contract and solve the is-
suance/signaling game. Nachman & Noe (1994) show in Theorem 5 that the unique equilibrium is pooling on the
same debt contract as long as the distribution of payoffs can be ranked by hazard rate dominance (A2). Another way
to obtain the result is to follow Roger B. Myerson (1983) and let banks offer a menu of securities in a first stage (see,
also, Eric Maskin & Jean Tirole (1992)). The inscrutability principle then ensures that no signaling occurs during
the contract-proposal phase, and we can focus on one incentive-compatible menu. Standard design arguments can
then be used to show that, under A1-A3, the best menu specifies the same debt contract for all types that invest.
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condition is equivalent to7
v¯ − x ≥ ρ (θ, rl0)− l0. (4)
The term ρ (θ, rl0)− l0 measures the informational rents paid by the firm. The rents are zero when
the rate is fair. The information cost is positive when r > r∗θ and negative (a subsidy) when r < r
∗
θ .
When informational rents are too large, firms might decide not to invest.
Since the right-hand side of equation (4) is increasing in θ, if θ wants to invest at rate r, any
type below θ also wants to invest at that same rate. The set of investing types is, therefore, [θ, θˆ],
and the marginal type θˆ is defined by
v¯ − x ≡ ρ
(
θˆ, rl0
)
− l0. (5)
The borrowing rate depends on the market’s perception about the mix of firms that invest. Let
h (.|1) describe the market’s beliefs about the type of firms that borrow to invest. Investors’ beliefs
must be consistent with Bayes’ rule: H (θ|1) = H (θ) /H
(
θˆ
)
if θ ∈
[
θ, θˆ
]
, and 0 otherwise. Finally,
the rate r must satisfy the zero-profit condition for private investors:
l0 =
∫ θˆ
θ
ρ (θ, rl0) dH (θ|1) . (6)
Proposition 1 The efficient outcome is sustainable without government intervention if and only if
there is a borrowing rate r such that (4) and (6) hold for θˆ = θ¯. All other equilibria have θˆ ∈ (θ, θ¯)
and are inefficient.
The intuition for Proposition 1 is as follows. The potential for adverse selection exists because
the investment condition (4) is more likely to hold for worse types than for better types.8 Multiple
equilibria are possible because of the endogenous response of the interest rate.9 Let rD denote
the lowest interest rate that can be supported without government intervention, and let θD be the
corresponding threshold. The best decentralized equilibrium
(
rD, θD
)
depends on c0 and on the
prior distribution of types.
In the remainder of the paper, we examine cases in which the efficient outcome is not sustainable
as a decentralized equilibrium–i.e., θD < θ¯. It is clear that higher cash levels increase θD and
improve economic efficiency. Therefore, governments might seek to inject liquidity into the firms.
Our goal is to design the most cost-effective interventions that achieve a given level of investment.
We do so formally in the next sections.
7We use the conventional assumption that, when indifferent, banks choose to invest.
8If the scale of investment were a choice variable, the separating equilibrium would involve good banks scaling
down to signal their types. With our technological assumption, they scale down to zero. The only important point
is that in both cases the equilibrium can be inefficient.
9Multiplicity arises for the same reasons as in signaling games.
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3 Mechanism Design with a Competitive Fringe
In this section, we present the government’s objective and describe the mechanism-design problem.
Without intervention, the best equilibrium is (rD, θD) described above. The government’s goal it to
find the cheapest possible way to implement any given level of investment.10 We denote the cost of
a government program by Ψ. While the government’s objective is straightforward, the mechanism-
design problem is non-standard because we assume that private markets remain open. The market
rate for non-participating firms, then, depends on the mechanism the government uses because
participation decisions convey information about private types. This interrelationship does not
exist in standard mechanism design, where outside options are independent from the mechanism.11
We refer to our model as mechanism design with a “competitive fringe.”
Government’s strategy
A government program P is a menu of contracts. The revelation principle applies and we can,
without loss of generality, consider programs with one contract per type.12 A contract specifies the
cash m injected at time 1 and the schedule of payments yg received by the government at time 2.
A generic program, therefore, takes the form: P = {mθ, ygθ}θ∈Θ. Under A3, ygθ is increasing in y
for all θ ∈ Θ.13
Firms’ strategy
A firm’s strategy consists of a participation decision and an investment decision as a function of its
type. At time 0, after the announcement of the government’s program, each firm chooses a contract
in P or opts out by choosing O. We allow firms to randomize their participation decisions. At time
1, given its type and its realized participation decision, each firm decides whether or not to invest:
i : Θ× {P ∪ O} → {0, 1} .
The choice of a government contract in P is observed by the market and induces a private lending
contract
(
lθ, y
l
θ
)
. If a firm of type θ chooses a contract
{
mθ′ , y
g
θ′
}
designed for θ′, its cash becomes
10In a general equilibrium model, one could– after the cost minimization– solve for the optimal level of investment.
We do not study this second stage here. Rather, we characterize the cost-minimizing intervention for any particular
level of investment the government might want to implement.
11In common agency problems, the interrelationship of the design problems is more complex since both principals
that offer contracts have bargaining power. In our paper, the principal’s (the government’s) mechanism induces a
competitive market’s response.
12In our model firms are ex-ante identical, so the government offers one menu. Otherwise the government should
condition on observable characteristics, such as size, or leverage, and our results would apply after this conditioning.
13This covers any program based on equity payoffs (common stock, preferred stock, warrants, etc.), as well as all
types of direct lending and debt-guarantee programs. The case of asset purchases can be analyzed by allowing ygθ to
depend on a. We discuss this extension in Section 6.
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c1 = c0 +mθ′ . If it invests, it must then borrow lθ′ = x− c0−mθ′ from the private market, and its
expected payoff is:
V
(
θ, θ′, 1
)
=
∫ ∞
0
(
y − ylθ′ (y)− ygθ′ (y)
)
f (y|θ) dy. (7)
If it does not invest, its expected payoff is V
(
θ, θ′, 0
)
= E [a|θ] + c0 +mθ′ −
∫∞
0 y
g
θ′ (y) f (y|θ) dy. If
the firm opts out of the government program, it has the option to borrow in the private market at
an interest rate r˜. The outside option of a type θ firm is, therefore,
V˜ (θ, r˜) = E [a|θ] + max {c0, v¯ − ρ (θ, r˜l0)} . (8)
Competitive Fringe
Regardless of whether a firm opts in or out, the interest rate at which it borrows must satisfy the
break-even condition of competitive lenders in equation (2). The information set I contains the
equilibrium strategies of the firms–the participation and investment mappings–and the observed
choices–the particular contract in P and the decision to demand a loan of size l.14 The loan is
l0 = x− c0 for firms opting out, and l0−mθ for firms opting in and choosing the contract designed
for θ.
Equilibrium Conditions
Fix a government intervention and market rate r˜ for non-participating firms. Let ΘP,1 denote
the set of types that participate and invest, and let ΘP,0 denote the types that participate but
do not invest. Define ΘP = ΘP,1 ∪ ΘP,0. Similarly, we can define ΘO,1 (respectively ΘO,0) to be
the corresponding non-participating sets of types, and ΘO = ΘO,1 ∪ ΘO,0. In order to have an
equilibrium, we must have:
• For i ∈ {0, 1} and θ ∈ ΘP,i, V (θ, θ, i) ≥ max
(
V
(
θ, θ′, j
)
, V˜ (θ, r˜)
)
, for j ∈ {0, 1} and
θ′ ∈ ΘP .
• For all θ ∈ ΘO, V˜ (θ, r˜) ≥ V
(
θ, θ′, j
)
for j ∈ {0, 1} and θ′ ∈ ΘP , and θ ∈ ΘO,1 ⇐⇒ v¯ − x ≥
ρ (θ, r˜l0)− l0.
These conditions summarize the incentive, investment and participation constraints for both par-
ticipating and non-participating firms.
14In other words, we assume that the private market sees not only whether a firm accepts public money, but also
under what conditions. Then, if in an equilibrium the government program is fully separating, there is no asymmetric
information left in the market. Despite this possibility, we show that programs in which all participating banks pool
at the same option are optimal.
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Private lenders must expect to break even, and their beliefs must be consistent with the equilibrium
behavior of the firms. For instance, if HO,1 denotes the market’s perception about the distribution
of firm types that choose to invest alone, the outside rate r˜ must satisfy
l0 =
∫
ΘO,1
ρ (θ, r˜l0) dHO,1(θ). (9)
Similar conditions must hold for firms that opt in and borrow lθ = x − c0 − mθ. Finally, the
resource constraint yl (y) + yg (y) ≤ y must hold for all contracts. In what follows, we, without loss
of generality, restrict our attention to interventions where the government receives junior claims–i.e.,
where new lenders are paid first according to ylθ (y) = min (y, rθlθ).
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To sum up, the design problem is complex because the participation decision is influenced by
the non-participation payoffs that depend on the market reaction, which is, in turn, endogenous
to the mechanism. In Section 4, we characterize the set of feasible interventions and derive lower
bounds on their costs. In Section 5, we show that these bounds are actually achieved by realistic
and commonly used interventions.
4 Cost-Minimizing Interventions
In this section, we study feasible interventions and derive lower bounds for their costs. We analyze
interventions where the competitive fringe is active–i.e., where some firms invest without the gov-
ernment’s assistance. When the competitive fringe is active, the marker rate r˜ is pinned down by
(9). The case where the competitive fringe is completely inactive–i.e., when ΘO,1 = ∅–is discussed
in Section 5.
4.1 Feasible Interventions
Any firm opting out of the program can borrow in the market at rate r˜. This rate defines a
marginal type θˆ (r˜) for which condition (4) holds with equality. The government knows that the
outside option of any type below θˆ is to invest, while the outside option of any type above θˆ is to do
nothing. We will establish that the government cannot selectively attract better types by showing
that in all feasible interventions, the types that invest with the help of the government are worse
than θˆ.
15To see this, imagine a program where the government has some senior claims y˜gsθ and some junior claims y˜
gj
θ . The
optimal private debt contract is y˜lθ = min (y − ygsθ , r˜θlθ) , and from the resource constraint we have ygsθ ≤ y and y˜gjθ = 0
for all y < r˜θlθ. Now consider an alternative program where all government claims are junior. The private contract
is ylθ = min (y, rθlθ). Define y
g
θ = min
(
y − ylθ, r˜θlθ
)
+
(
y˜gsθ + y˜
gj
θ
)
1y>r˜θlθ . This contract gives exactly the same payoff
function to the bank, so it leaves all participation, incentive, and investment constraints unchanged. Finally, since
lθ = E
[
y˜lθ
]
= E
[
ylθ
]
, it follows that E [ygθ ] = E
[
y˜gsθ + y˜
gj
θ
]
, and the cost to the government is unchanged.
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We first introduce some notation and establish an important building block of our analysis in
Lemma 1. Firms that participate and invest receive income y − ylθ − ygθ . The difference between
inside and outside payoffs conditional on investment in both cases is then: γθ(y) ≡ min (y, r˜l0) −
min (y, rθlθ)− ygθ (y) . From the participation constraint V (θ, θ, 1) ≥ V˜ (θ, r˜) of investing types, we
then obtain:
E [γθ(y)|θ] ≥ 0 for all θ ∈ ΘP,1. (10)
The following Lemma establishes a Single Crossing Property that plays a central role in our analysis.
Lemma 1 Single Crossing Property. If E [γθ(y)|θ] ≥ 0 for some θ ∈ Θ, then E
[
γθ(y)|θ′
] ≥ 0
for all θ′ < θ. If, in addition, γθ(y) 6= 0 for some y ∈ Y , then E
[
γθ(y)|θ′
]
> 0.
Proof. See Appendix.
Lemma 1 says that if a type prefers the strategy ‘opt-in-and-invest’ to the strategy ‘invest-
alone,’ then all types below it have the same preference. In other words, irrespective of the way the
government intervenes (so long as repayments to the government increase in the firms’ total income
at time 2), if some type prefers to invest with the help of the government, rather than investing
alone, all worse types want to do the same. This result is driven by the same forces that cause the
original market failure–namely, that good types expect to repay relatively more than bad types.
An important subtlety, however, is that what matters is the difference in expected payments inside
or outside the program, both of which are increasing in θ. An additional complication is that the
function γθ(y) is not monotonic. It is typically positive for low values of y and then decreasing. The
key is that it can switch sign only once, for some income realization yˆ. This explains why first-order
stochastic dominance is not enough and why we need conditional stochastic dominance (or hazard-
rate dominance) in A2. We can then apply stochastic dominance conditional on income being more
(or less) than yˆ, and obtain our result. The interesting point is that A2 is also the necessary and
sufficient condition for debt to be optimal in the capital-raising game under asymmetric information
(Nachman & Noe 1994).
Lemma 1 has important implications. First, as long as some firms invest without the govern-
ment’s help, no type above θˆ (r˜) invests.
Proposition 2 When the competitive fringe is active, the set of investing firms is contained in the
interval
[
θ, θˆ (r˜)
]
.
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Proof. For non-participating types (θ ∈ ΘO), the Proposition follows from the definition of
θˆ (r˜). For participating types, we argue by contradiction. Suppose that there is a participating type
θ strictly above θˆ (r˜) that invests–that is, θ ∈ ΘP,1. Because θ > θˆ (r˜), we have that E [a|θ] + c0 >
E [a|θ]+ v¯−ρ (θ, r˜l0). Moreover, since θ ∈ ΘP,1, we have that E [a|θ]+ v¯−ρ (θ, rθlθ)−E
[
ygθ (y) |θ
] ≥
E [a|θ] + c0. Together, these two inequalities imply that E [γθ(y)|θ] > 0. From Lemma 1, we then
know that E [γθ′(y)|θ] > 0 for all types θ′ < θ. Therefore,
[
θ, θˆ (r˜)
]
⊂ ΘP,1 and ΘO,1 ⊂
[
θˆ (r˜) , θ¯
]
,
but this contradicts the definition of θˆ (r˜), which says that types above θˆ (r˜) do not invest at the
market rate r˜.
Proposition 2 shows that no type above θˆ (r˜) will invest, and it is reminiscent of the stan-
dard adverse-selection unraveling result. In other words, the government cannot eliminate adverse
selection. It can only limit the unraveling.
The key point to understand is that, in equilibrium, the government cannot attract a type above
θˆ (r˜) and make this type invest. The reason is that, as shown in Lemma 1, all types worse than
θˆ (r˜) would choose to mimic this type rather than go to the market. But, then, private lenders
would anticipate lending only to types above θˆ (r˜) and would rationally charge a low rate, inducing
investment beyond θˆ (r˜), who, therefore, could not be the marginal type. Hence, irrespective of the
intervention, the best investing type is still willing to be financed by the market.
Proposition 2 also implies that we can, without loss of generality, focus on programs where
only types below θˆ participate in the government program. To see why, imagine that a type θ′ >
θˆ (r˜) participates. We know that this type does not invest and must get at least its outside option.
But, then, the government can simply have this type drop out (by charging an infinitesimal fee, for
instance). This does not affect the outside market rate because θ′ does not invest. Therefore, we
have the following corollary to Proposition 2.
Corollary 1 Without loss of generality, only types below θˆ (r˜) participate in the government’s
program: ΘP ⊂
[
θ, θˆ (r˜)
]
.
Another important implication of Lemma 1 is that the government cannot design a program
that attracts only good firms and induces them to invest. This suggests that all interventions that
increase investment will be costly. This is, indeed, what we show next.
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4.2 Minimum Cost of Intervention
In this section, we obtain a lower bound for the cost of interventions based on the minimal rents
necessary to implement a given level of investment.
Corollary 1 argues that, when the competitive fringe is active, without loss, participating types,
ΘP , are a subset of
[
θ, θˆ (r˜)
]
. Lemma 1 and the analysis of decentralized equilibria in Section
2, imply that the most attractive type to mimic for types in
[
θ, θˆ (r˜)
]
is the best type investing,
θˆ (r˜). Moreover, Proposition 2 tells us that when the competitive fringe is active, the best type
investing θˆ (r˜) invests without government help. Then, total rents paid to the firms with types
in
[
θ, θˆ (r˜)
]
must be at least equal to the ones enjoyed from mimicking θˆ (r˜) , which are equal to∫ θˆ(r˜)
θ (l0 − ρ (θ, r˜l0)) dH(θ). This last point says that if a type below θˆ (r˜) mimics it, the rents will be
equal to the ones that that type would obtain by investing alone in the market; hence, participation
constraints are tight. The tricky issue is that, possibly, only some types in
[
θ, θˆ (r˜)
]
participate, and
they could be doing so randomly. But (9) tells us that the market breaks even for non-participating
firms thus all rents enjoyed by firms are paid by the government. Since rents are independent of
the level of investment below type θˆ (r˜) , an optimal program must induce investment for all types
in
[
θ, θˆ (r˜)
]
. The equilibrium level of investment, before and after the government’s intervention,
is depicted in Figure 2.
insert Figure 2 here
Based on these two observations, we obtain Theorem 1, which describes the properties of feasible
and optimal programs:
Theorem 1 When the competitive fringe is active, feasible programs are characterized by an in-
vestment cutoff θˆ and an associated market rate r˜. The cost of a feasible program cannot be less
than the informational rents at rate r˜
Ψ∗ (r˜) =
∫ θˆ(r˜)
θ
(l0 − ρ (θ, r˜l0)) dH(θ). (11)
A program reaches the lower bound Ψ∗ (r˜) if and only if all types below θˆ invest and γθ(.) is iden-
tically zero for all types above the lowest type.
Proof. We have already argued that given an investment cutoff θˆ, the minimal cost is given by
(11). From equation (10), we know that E [γθ(y)|θ] ≥ 0 for all participating types. From Lemma
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1, we further know that if γθ(y) 6= 0 for some y ∈ Y and some type θ ∈ ΘP , then E
[
γθ(y)|θ′
]
> 0
for all θ < θ′, implying a cost Ψ > Ψ∗ (r˜). For the cost to be Ψ∗ (r˜), we must, therefore, have
γθ(y) = 0 for all y ∈ Y and all θ ∈ ΘP,1/ {θ}.
Our analysis shows that cost minimization requires two things: making all types below θˆ (r˜)
invest (this maximizes the pie to be split), and making all participation constraints bind (this
minimizes the rents to the firms). The lower bound of costs cannot be less than the informational
rents at rate r˜ and is strictly positive for all interventions that increase investment–i.e., for all
interventions that implement θˆ (r˜) > θD, since θD is the highest type for which the break-even
constraint (6) holds. To go beyond θD, the government is forced to pay information rents. Theorem
1 tells us that the number and types of participating firms matters only through r˜. Hence, we have
the following Corollary:
Corollary 2 For a given outside rate r˜, the minimum cost does not depend on the participation
in the program.
The intuition of this result is as follows: The market rate pins down the investment threshold
(cf Proposition 2), which, in turn, pins down the unavoidable rents that the government needs to
pay. There are many participation regimes that would lead to the same rate. The crucial feature
is that the relative proportion of non-participating and investing types is such that it leads to the
same break-even interest rate for the market.
More formally, let p (θ) ∈ [0, 1] be the probability of participation in the program for any type
θ ∈ [θ, θˆ (r˜)]. Corollary 2 tells us that the actual participation rate of various types is irrelevant,
so long as it leads to the same market rate. The equilibrium participation function p must be such
that lenders break even on types opting out, when the rate is r˜–that is:
l0 =
∫ θˆ(r˜)
θ
[∫
Y
min (y, r˜l0) f (y|θ) dy
]
(1− p (θ)) dH (θ)∫ θˆ(r˜)
θ (1− p (s)) dH (s)
. (12)
There are many participation functions p that induce the same r˜, as Figure 3 illustrates.
insert Figure 3 here
The minimal-sized program, depicted in Figure 3a, attracts the worst types–that is, p (θ) =
1θ<θp for all types below some cutoff θ
p, and zero otherwise. The cutoff θP must be such that (12)
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holds at r˜. At the other extreme, we can have p (θ) → 1 for all θ ∈
[
θ, θˆ (r˜)
]
and ΘO,1 → ∅.16
Any size between the minimal size and the limit where all investing types participate delivers the
same exact cost and level of investment. So, any size between H (θp) and H
(
θˆ (r˜)
)
can be an
equilibrium.
One way to grasp this result is the following. Start from the minimal intervention with size
H (θp). Consider the types left out to invest alone–that is, types between θp and θˆ (r˜). Now
take a random sample of these types. By definition, the expected repayment for this random
sample is exactly equal to the loan. This has two implications. First, removing the sample does
not change the market rate r˜. Second, adding the sample to the program does not change the
expected cost for the government. Therefore, any random sample can be taken and any size
between H (θp) and H
(
θˆ (r˜)
)
can be obtained. Actually, the range of possible participation is
even greater than suggested by this explanation: One can have a program where some types below
θp do not participate, and participation schedules can obviously be discontinuous and contain holes.
All these programs would appear different, since participation would vary greatly, but their cost
and investment level would be exactly the same.
The second important implication of Theorem 1 concerns the schedule of payments received by
the government. The requirement that γθ(.) be identically zero restricts the shape of the payoff
functions that the government should offer, as explained in the following corollary.
Corollary 3 Any feasible program that achieves investment
[
θ, θˆ (r˜)
]
at minimum cost Ψ∗ (r˜) must
be such that, for all y ∈ Y and all θ ∈ ΘP,1/ {θ}
ygθ (y) = min (y, r˜l0)−min (y, rθlθ) . (13)
The intuition of this result is as follows: Theorem 1 tells us that reaching the lower bound on
cost requires that, for all income realizations, the difference between repayments in and out of the
program are the same (this way, the government makes sure that participation constraints bind for
all types at the same time.) This implies that the shape of repayments in the program must be
the same as that of repayments outside the program. Since the market employs debt contracts, in
order to match the shape of repayments, the government must employ debt-like instruments.
Theorem 1 tells us what the government can hope to achieve, but the derivation of the lower
bound takes into account only the participation constraints of the firms, ignoring the investment
16For instance, start from p(θ) = 1θ<θp and let p increase uniformly for all types in
[
θ, θˆ (r˜)
]
.
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and incentive constraints. In the next section, we show how to design interventions that reach the
lower bound and establish that (13) is achieved by debt-like instruments.
5 Implementation
We now study feasible interventions that reach the lower bound Ψ∗ (r˜). Corollary 3 shows that
financial instruments that do not have the payoff structure of equation (13) cannot achieve the
lowest cost. This suggests that the government should intervene with debt-like instruments. This
is, indeed, what we show.
Recall from Section 2 that the best decentralized equilibrium is characterized by θD < θ¯. We
can, then, think of the implementation as follows. The government chooses a target for aggregate
investment θT ∈ (θD, θ¯].17 Through equation (5), this is equivalent to choosing a target RT for the
market rate. For now, we take θˆ and RT as given, and we study the minimum cost of implementing
θˆ = θT . Implementation determines the structure of payoffs and implies an allocation of types to
the sets ΘP,1 and ΘO,1.
As explained in Corollary 2, the actual participation rate of various types is irrelevant so long
as it leads to the same market rate. Given a participation function consistent with r˜ = RT in the
competitive fringe, the government still has several choices regarding the size of its loans (lend l0
or less) and the security design (direct lending versus debt guarantees).
For simplicity in the following discussion, we consider a participation function p (θ) = 1θ<θp ,
depicted in Figure 3a. Then, θp is uniquely pinned down by the break-even constraint l0 =
1
H(θT )−H(θp)
∫ θT
θp ρ
(
θ,RT l0
)
dH (θ) . We start with the simplest program: direct lending.
Proposition 3 With an active competitive fringe, direct lending by the government of l0 at rate
RT uniquely implements the desired investment at the minimum cost.
Proof. In order to achieve the investment target θT , the interest rate RT is such that θˆ
(
RT
)
=
θT in equation (5). Note that 1 < RT < rD since θT ∈ (θD, θ¯]. The program corresponds to
mθ = l0, lθ = 0, and y
g
θ (y) = min
(
y,RT l0
)
for all types. The incentive and investment constraints
are clearly satisfied for all participating firms. Firms in ΘO,0 do not want to participate without
investing since RT > 1. We cannot have r˜ < RT since all firms would then drop out and the market
rate would be r˜ = rD > RT . We cannot have r˜ > RT ; otherwise, ΘO,1 = ∅, which contradicts
17This is equivalent to a target xH
(
θT
)
for investment spending, or a target (v¯ − x)H (θT ) for value added.
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the fact that the competitive fringe is active. Hence, we must have r˜ = RT . Then, γθ(y) = 0 and
Ψ = Ψ∗
(
RT
)
.
The direct-lending program implements the desired level of investment and achieves the mini-
mum cost, which are the only outcomes the government cares about. The key points are that (i) at
RT , target investment θT is achieved; (ii) the incentive constraints are trivially satisfied since the
government program offers one option for all types; and (iii) given that r˜ = RT is the market rate,
participation constraints hold with equality for all participating types. With other programs, such
as equity injections, the participation constraint binds only for the best participating type, while
all others receive rents.18
We now discuss equivalent implementations varying by the size of the loan and the security
design:
Size of Loans: Consider a program where the government lends m < l0 at a rate R < R
T .
Participating types [θ, θp] must now borrow lu = l0−m on the market at a rate r that satisfies the
zero-profit condition of the lenders:
lu = l0 −m = 1
H (θp)
∫ θp
θ
ρ (θ, rlu) dH (θ) . (14)
Given θp, equation (14) defines a schedule rlu strictly decreasing in m. Finally, the face value of
the government loan Rm must satisfy the condition γ = 0–i.e., Rm+ rlu (m) = RT l0. We cannot
have R < 1; otherwise, some firms would take the cash without investing. The maximal program
(analyzed in Proposition 3) corresponds to m = l0, rl
u = 0, and R = RT . The minimal lending
program mmin is defined as the unique solution to rlu (m) +m−RT l0 = 0;19 that is,
rlu
(
mmin
)
+mmin −RT l0 = 0. (15)
Any outcome that can be implemented by lending l0 at rate R
T can also be implemented by a
continuum of programs with m ∈ (mmin, l0] and R ∈ (1, RT ].20
18The only exception is when only the worst type participates–i.e., ΘP = {θ}. With an atom-less distribution,
such a program cannot increase investment, but if Pr (θ = θ) > 0, the government might choose a program where
ΘP = {θ}. Then, optimality requires that E
[
γθ(y)|θ
]
= 0, and this can be achieved in various ways. For instance,
the government might offer cash m against a share α of equity returns. Opting into the program reveals the type
to the lenders, and we must have E [min (y, rθlθ) |θ] = l0 − m. The condition E
[
γθ(y)|θ
]
= 0 simply implies
(1− α)m− αE [y|θ] = ρ (θ, r˜l0)− l0. The parameters (m,α) pin down the generosity of the program and, therefore,
in equilibrium, the outside rate r˜. The more bad types that opt in, the lower is r˜, and the more costly the program
becomes.
19The solution exists because the function is continuous, negative at m = l0 since rl
u (l0) = 0 and R
T > 1, and
positive at m = 0 since rlu (l0) ≥ RT l0. The solution is unique because ∂rlu∂m < −1. To see why, notice that (14)
implies ∂rl
u
∂m
= − H(θp)∫ θp
θ
∂ρ(θ,rlu)
∂rlu
dH(θ)
and (3) implies ∂ρ(θ,rl
u)
∂rlu
= 1− F (rlu|θ) < 1.
20The only potential issue is unicity. The endogeneity of the borrowing rate r could lead to multiple equilibria for
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Security Design: The government also has a choice of which debt instrument to use. In particular,
direct-lending and debt-guarantee programs are equivalent. Instead of lending directly, the gov-
ernment can guarantee offers to guarantee new debt issuance up to an amount S (the size of the
secured loan) for a fee φ paid up-front: m = −φS. Private lenders accept an interest rate of 1 on
the guaranteed debt, so the budget constraint at time 1 becomes
x = c0 + (1− φ)S + lu,
where lu is the unsecured loan. The government has to make payments in case of default–that is,
whenever a+ v < S.
The debt guarantee and direct lending programs are equivalent when R = (1− φ)−1 and m =
(1− φ)S. In practice, central firms use direct lending, while governments seem to favor debt
guarantees. A reason might be that, while equivalent in market-value terms, the programs differ
in accounting terms since debt guarantees are contingent liabilities and do not appear as increases
in public debt.
Implementation without Competitive Fringe
We now ask what happens if the government has the power to shut down the market. We obtain
the following result:
Proposition 4 The cost of implementing θT > θD remains the same, Ψ∗
(
RT
)
, even if the gov-
ernment shuts down private markets. The minimum cost Ψ∗
(
RT
)
is achieved by direct government
lending of l0 at rate R
T .
Proof. Notice, first, that it is still true (and, in fact, easier to show) that, regardless of the type
of government program, only types below a threshold invest. The difference between participation
and non-participation payoffs conditional on investing in the program is
v¯ − c0 −
∫
Y
[
min (y, rθlθ) + y
g
θ (y)
]
f (y|θ) dy.
The last term is increasing in θ. This immediately implies that the investment and participation
set is
[
θ, θT
]
and that θT is the most attractive type to mimic. The type θT is indifferent between
investing and not investing, so its payoff is E
[
a|θT ]+c0. Let ygθT (y) denote the repayment function
some distribution H. This problem can be ruled out if we allow coordination on the best feasible outcome, or if we
impose enough concavity on H (log-concavity is often used in mechanism design for this purpose). Note, however,
that this multiplicity does not arise from the intervention itself, since it is also present without intervention, as
discussed in Section 2. It is different from the multiplicity created by menus, which occurs for any distribution, as
discussed below.
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of type θT , and redefine γθ(y) ≡ ygθT (y)− y
g
θ (y) . Incentive-compatibility implies that γ
g
θ(y) ≥ 0 for
all θ. Then, for the reasons explained in the proof of Theorem 1, a lower bound on cost is achieved
when γgθ(y) = 0 for all y and all θ > θ. This can be achieved by direct lending of l0 at rate R
T .
This result is not obvious for two reasons: monopoly power and stigma. If the government is
the sole lender, it has monopoly power and can set any lending rate (or choose any mechanism)
without the fear that firms will drop out and borrow from the market. However, given that the
equilibrium feasible investment and participation set is still
[
θ, θT
]
, the government cannot avoid
rewarding rents to all types
[
θ, θT
]
who would otherwise mimic θT . At an optimal intervention,
regardless of whether or not there is a private market, this type is indifferent between investing
and not investing, so it always earns E
[
a|θT ] + c0. Hence, the rents that the government must
pay to induce investment
[
θ, θT
]
are independent from the existence of a market. We conclude
that the competitive fringe does not impose extra costs when the government uses an optimal
implementation.21
We summarize our implementation results in the following Theorem.
Theorem 2 Direct-lending and debt-guarantee programs uniquely implement any investment set
of the form
[
θ, θˆ (r˜)
]
at minimum cost Ψ∗ (r˜). The cost of implementation does not change even if
the government has the power to shut down private markets.
We conclude this section with a brief discussion of menus, arguing that they are less robust than
simple programs. Notice that the payoff structure of equation (13) applies to all interventions. Even
with menus, the government must use debt-like instruments. Proposition 3 describes an optimal
implementation using one debt contract. In the Appendix, we describe interventions with menus of
debt contracts. While (non-trivial) menus can implement an optimal outcome, they can never do so
uniquely. Alongside the equilibrium where each type chooses the correct contract, there is always
an equilibrium where all the types pool on the contract designed for the worst type. Any non-trivial
menu can, thus, overshoot its target and end up costing more than intended. This cannot happen
with simple programs since all participating types already pool on the unique contract offered by
the government. In this sense, simple programs are more robust than programs with menus.
21The case of inactive fringe also arises when the market rate for non-participating firms is too high for investment
outside the program. Our results apply to the case of an inactive fringe regardless of what causes the inactivity.
22
6 Extensions
In this section, we provide three important extensions to our main results. The first extension is
to consider asymmetric information with respect to new investment opportunities. The second is
to analyze asset purchases. The third is to consider the consequences of moral hazard in addition
to adverse selection.
6.1 Asymmetric information about new loans
We have assumed so far that the distribution of v is independent of the firm’s type. Let us now
relax this assumption, while maintaining assumptions A2 and A3. We replace A1 by:
Assumption A1’: E [v|θ] > x and E [v|θ] is increasing in θ.
Our results hold under A1’. Firms continue to offer debt contracts, and expected repayments
are still given by ρ (θ, rl). The investment condition, however, becomes E [v|θ] − x > ρ (θ, rl) − l
for type θ. The significant difference is that it might potentially hold for good firms and not for
bad firms. This does not, however, change the nature of the decentralized equilibrium: There is
still some threshold below which types invest. Proposition 1 still holds, and the results in Sections
3 to 5 are unaffected.22
6.2 Asset Purchases
Our benchmark model follows Myers & Majluf (1984) in assuming that cash flows are fungible.
Assumption A1 rules out contracts written directly on a. We can dispense with this assumption
in two ways: by assuming asymmetric information with respect to v, as explained above,23 or
by allowing asset purchases, but not spin-offs. In other words, we can allow contracts that are
increasing in both a and y.24 One such contract is the purchase of Z units of face value of the
legacy assets. If p is the purchase prize, the net payoffs are aZ/A− pZ. All our results hold in this
setup. We can show that firms continue to offer debt contracts and that optimal interventions still
22Note that A1’ implies that all types still have positive NPV projects. If instead E [v|θ] < x, the complication is
that Proposition 1 need not hold. Essentially, adverse selection worsens and total market breakdowns are possible
(equilibria where decentralized investment is zero). Interventions can become, at the same time, more desirable and
more expensive (since the government finances some negative NPV projects). As long as A2 holds, however, debt
contracts are still optimal, and, based on the discussion in Section 5, we conjecture that optimal interventions still
involve simple debt-guarantee programs or direct lending.
23A particularly simple case to analyze is when investment simply scales up existing operations. We can capture
this with v = αa for some constant α. In this case, we can allow contracts to be written on either a or v.
24This rules out a contract on v = y − a, which is effectively a spin-off. Details can be found in an earlier version
of the paper and are available upon request.
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use debt-guarantee or direct-lending programs. Moreover, we can show that, among sub-optimal
interventions, asset purchases do strictly worse than equity injections.
6.3 Moral hazard
Our benchmark model takes investment opportunities as exogenous. In practice, however, firms
can partially control the riskiness of their new loans. To understand how endogenous risk-taking
affects our results, we introduce a new project with random payoff v′. This project also costs
x but is riskier (in the sense of second-order stochastic dominance) and has a lower expected
value: E [v′] < E [v]. To emphasize moral hazard created by government interventions, we assume
that market participants can detect the choice of v′, but this choice is not contractible by the
government.25
Assumption A4: The choice of project v′ is observed by private lenders but cannot be controlled
by the government.
Under A4, we can derive three important results (the proofs are in the Appendix). First, there
is no risk-shifting without government intervention, and Proposition 1 is unchanged. The intuition
is that choosing v′ is doubly costly. It increases the borrowing rate because of greater objective
risk (a direct effect), but it also sends a negative signal about the firm’s type. This indirect effect
occurs because good types dislike high rates relatively more than bad types.26
The second result is that government interventions are more likely to induce moral hazard when
government loans are larger. Risk-taking might occur because the government lends at a rate that is
independent of the project chosen. The risk of moral hazard is maximized by the program
(
l0, R
T
)
and minimized by the program
(
mmin, 1
)
described in Section 5.
The third point is that, even if moral hazard occurs with minimal lending, the government can
prevent risk-shifting by making its lending rate contingent on the rate charged by private lenders.
The government lends mmin, defined by equation (15) at rate R = 1 as long as the private lenders’
rate r does not exceed the break-even rate consistent with no risk-shifting, which we define as
r∗. Otherwise, the government charges the same rate as the private lenders. Any risk-shifting
25This is so either because the government has an inferior detection technology and does not observe v′, or because
this choice cannot be verified as in the incomplete contract literature. The point of A4 is to study inefficiencies
created by government interventions. If v′ is not observable by private investors, risk-shifting occurs with or without
government intervention.
26In fact, it is easy to see that good types would be willing sacrifice NPV in exchange for safer projects because
such anti-risk shifting would function as a costly signaling device. Good banks would become too conservative in
their lending policies during a crisis in order to signal their types. We note that this would make debt guarantees
more appealing since guarantees would lean against the conservatism bias.
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deviation would bring the firm back to the case without intervention, where we have already seen
that risk-shifting does not take place. Hence, deviations never occur and risk-shifting is eliminated.
Formally, define r∗ as the solution to
l0 −mmin = E
[
ρ
(
θ,mmin + r∗lu
) | θ ∈ [θ, θp]] . (16)
We then have the following proposition:
Proposition 5 Suppose that the government lends mmin at rate R = 1 as long as r ≤ r∗, and
threatens to charge the private rate if r > r∗. Then, there is no risk shifting.
We conclude that moral hazard has important implications for the design of interventions. It
breaks the equivalence results of Section 5 between programs with large and small loans. To prevent
moral hazard, it is necessary to observe a private lending rate, so the government should not be the
sole lender. With small-loan interventions, the government can prevent risk-shifting by observing
private rates even if the government itself has no direct monitoring technology. In practice, it is
important to choose a private rate that the borrower cannot manipulate (i.e., the rate on a large
corporate bond issuance). The same results apply to debt guarantees: the guarantee should not
cover the entire loan.
7 Conclusion
Since we have already summarized our findings in the introduction, we conclude with a short
discussion of how our theoretical results relate to actual interventions–in particular, those used
during the recent financial crisis. We first note that the presence of a stigma attached to government
programs is an important issue. Policy makers understand that the acceptance of government
assistance could be an admission of financial weakness and that this can result in insufficient
uptake. In the Fall of 2008, the U.S. Treasury was concerned about the market reaction if the best
banks decided to opt out of its recapitalization program.
The second important dimension is the choice of financial instruments. In our model, cost
minimization requires debt instruments (either direct lending or debt guarantees). In practice,
debt guarantees and direct lending are widely used, but equity injections are also prevalent, and
asset buybacks are sometimes used, as well. While a detailed discussion is clearly beyond the scope
of this paper, we conjecture the following general result: The optimal choice of security is directly
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related to the nature of the financial friction and the associated market failure. We illustrate
this conjecture with two recent papers. Philippon & Schnabl (2009) study optimal bailouts when
investment is limited by debt overhang. In that context, the key friction is lack of capital, and
equity injections dominate debt guarantees. Tirole (2010) studies a model where the pledgeable
income of new projects is limited by moral hazard, and legacy assets need to be sold to raise capital.
In that context, the optimal intervention uses assets purchases. Our conjecture is therefore that
the optimal instrument for a particular intervention should resemble the contracts used by private-
market participants. Dealing with debt overhang requires equity; unfreezing the debt market
requires debt guarantees; and jump starting the securitization market requires asset purchases. A
general proof of this conjecture is a project for future research.
Appendix
A Proof of Lemma 1
The proof focuses on the shape of the function γθ(y) ≡ min(y, r˜l0)−min(y, rθlθ)− ygθ (y). We first
show that γθ is weakly positive for low values of y, and then decreasing. Recall that y
g
θ is increasing
in y, and the resource constraint imposes yg ≤ y − min(y, rθlθ). For y ≤ min(r˜l0, rθlθ), we have
y = min(y, rθlθ) and, therefore, γθ = −yg ≥ 0. If r˜l0 < rθlθ, then γ is decreasing for all y > r˜l0. If
r˜l0 > rθlθ, the relevant case in later analysis, then for y ∈ [rθlθ, r˜l0], we have γθ = y− rθlθ − ygθ(y).
Since yg ≤ y− rθlθ, this means γθ ≥ 0. For y > r˜l0, we have γθ(y) = r˜l0 − rθlθ − ygθ(y) decreasing
in y since ygθ is increasing. We conclude that, in all cases, γθ is weakly positive for low values of
y, and then decreasing. There are two possibilities: Either γθ(y) ≥ 0 for all y, or there exists a
yˆ such that γθ(y) < 0 for all y > yˆ. If γθ(y) ≥ 0, then the Lemma (with both weak and strong
inequalities) follows directly from the first part of A2. In the second case, E [γθ(y)|θ] ≥ 0 implies
that ∫ yˆ
0
γθ(y)f (y|θ) dy ≥
∫ ∞
yˆ
−γθ(y)f (y|θ) dy. (17)
Since γθ(y) < 0 for all y > yˆ, both sides are strictly positive. Consider θ
′ < θ.
For y > yˆ, we know that γθ is negative and decreasing, implying that −γθ is positive and
increasing. The monotone hazard rate property implies conditional expectation dominance (see
Nachman & Noe (1994)) that gives us
∫∞
yˆ −γθ(y) f(y|θ)1−F (yˆ|θ)dy >
∫∞
yˆ −γθ(y) f(y|θ
′)
1−F (yˆ|θ′)dy or∫ ∞
yˆ
−γθ(y)f (y|θ) dy >
1− F (yˆ|θ)
1− F (yˆ|θ′)
∫ ∞
yˆ
−γθ(y)f
(
y|θ′) dy. (18)
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The monotone hazard rate property implies that 1−F (y|θ)
1−F (y|θ′) is increasing in y, which, together with
the definition of MHR, implies that f (y|θ) ≤ f (y|θ′) 1−F (yˆ|θ)
1−F (yˆ|θ′) . Then, for all y < yˆ, we have∫ yˆ
0
γθ(y)f (y|θ) dy <
1− F (yˆ|θ)
1− F (yˆ|θ′)
∫ yˆ
0
γθ(y)f
(
y|θ′) dy. (19)
Combining (18) with (19), we finally obtain:
1− F (yˆ|θ)
1− F (yˆ|θ′)
∫ yˆ
0
γθ(y)f
(
y|θ′) dy > 1− F (yˆ|θ)
1− F (yˆ|θ′)
∫ ∞
yˆ
−γθ (y) f
(
y|θ′) dy,
and, therefore, E
[
γθ(y)|θ′
]
=
∫∞
0 γθ(y)f
(
y|θ′) dy > 0.
B Menus
Suppose that the government offers a menu of contracts (mθ, Rθ) where mθ is the loan and Rθ is
the interest rate. Type θ then borrows lθ = l0 −mθ from the market, and since the choice of the
contract reveals the type, the zero profit condition type by type implies:
ρ (θ, rθlθ) = l0 −mθ. (20)
In order for the menu to be optimal, we need γθ(y) = 0, or, equivalently,
Rθmθ + rθlθ = R
T l0. (21)
The menu is feasible if and only if (20) and (21) are satisfied and Rθ ≥ 1 for all θ. There are
obviously several ways to design a menu. Since ∂ρ(θ,rθlθ)∂rθlθ = 1− F (rθlθ|θ), the menu must solve the
differential system
∂ρ
∂θ
dθ + (1− F (rθlθ|θ)) d (rθlθ) + dmθ = 0,
d (Rθmθ) + d (rθlθ) = 0.
For concreteness, we study ΘP = [θ, θp] and Rθ = 1 for all types in ΘP . Then, the schedule is
pinned down by the differential equation
F (rθlθ|θ) dmθ = −∂ρ
∂θ
dθ for all θ ∈ ΘP ,
and the initial condition ρ
(
θp, RT l0 −mθp
)
= l0 − mθp . Government loans decrease with θ and
compensate the types for revealing their private information. This menu is clearly feasible and
reaches the lower bound for cost Ψ∗
(
RT
)
.
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Menus, however, are susceptible to multiple equilibria. To see why, imagine that all types in
ΘP pool on the contract designed for the worst type θ. Let r¯ be the corresponding break-even rate.
Clearly, we must have r¯ < rθ. Therefore, Rθmθ + r¯lθ < Rθmθ + rθlθ = R
T l0. This deviation is
profitable for all types and is incompatible with θT remaining the marginal type. The equilibrium
will then be one of a unique contract of lending mθ at rate Rθ, but with a strictly higher marginal
type θˆ > θT and a strictly higher cost.
C Moral Hazard
We prove three claims: (i) There is no risk-shifting without interventions; (ii) smaller government
loans create less moral hazard; and (iii) there exists a simple contingent program that removes
moral hazard.
For (i), consider an equilibrium with risk-shifting. Let r be the borrowing rate for v and r′ > r
for v′. Type θ chooses to risk-shift if and only if
v¯ − ρ (θ, rl0) > v¯′ − ρ′
(
θ, r′l0
)
.
It is clear that if a particular type θ wants to risk-shift, a worse type would also want to risk-shift.27
Hence, the set of risk-shifting types is Θ′ =
[
θ, θ′
]
for some θ′. We first show that Θ′ = ∅ when
there is no intervention.
Lemma 2 The decentralized equilibrium without intervention is unaffected by the availability of
project v′.
Proof. Consider the highest type θ′ that chooses v′. For type θ′, we have ρ
(
θ′, r′l0
)
> l0
since θ′ pools with lower types. This type can strictly benefit by choosing v because v is safer and
because it would pool with better types.
For (ii), suppose that the government lends l0 at R
T . Then, the condition for risk-shifting to
occur is
ρ
(
θ,RT l0
)− ρ′ (θ,RT l0) > v¯ − v¯′. (22)
The firm faces no penalty for risk-shifting, apart from the NPV loss. If condition (22) holds for θ,
then some risk-shifting does occur in the program with large loans. When m < l0, on the other
27This always holds when banks can offer menus of borrowing and projects and the inscrutability principle holds,
as in Myerson (1983). If there is signaling at the proposal stage, we need a refinement to rule out unreasonable
equilibria where risk-taking happens to be a good signal.
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hand, we need to look for a cutoff θ′ such that
l0 −m = E
[
ρ′
(
θ,Rm+ r′lu
) | θ ∈ [θ, θ′]] ,
and
l0 −m = E
[
ρ (θ,Rm+ rlu) | θ ∈ [θ′, θp]] .
The condition for risk-shifting is the indifference of the marginal type: ρ
(
θ′, Rm+ rlu
)−ρ′ (θ,Rm+ r′lu) =
v¯ − v¯′. This is clearly stronger than condition (22) because of the risk-sensitive rate and the ad-
verse signaling effect. The government needs to maximize the amount borrowed on the market to
minimize risk-shifting incentives. Within the class of interventions studied in the paper, it does so
by lending m = mmin defined in (15).
For (iii), consider the implementation with lending mmin at rate R = 1. Define r∗ as the solution
to
l0 −mmin = E
[
ρ
(
θ,mmin + r∗lu
) | θ ∈ [θ, θp]] .
Suppose that the government offers to lend mmin at rate R = 1 as long as r ≤ r∗, and at a rate
equal to the private rate for this firm (R = r) otherwise. If a firm risk-shifts, its interest rate
will strictly exceed r∗ and it will be punished by losing the government subsidy. From the above
discussion, it is clear that no firm will ever risk-shift.
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